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Ending the Uniformity of Residential 
Real Estate Brokerage Services 
ANALYZING THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
REALTORS’ MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE  
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Buying a home is frequently described as the most 
significant transaction people undergo during their lifetime.1 
Because the home-buying process can often be complicated and 
overwhelming, most buyers enlist the help of a real estate 
agent.2 Similarly, most sellers hire a real estate agent to list 
and market their property.3 As a result, real estate agents are 
involved in approximately eighty-one percent of all residential 
real estate closings in the United States.4 Over $60 billion were 
spent on brokerage services in 2005,5 and the National 
Association of Realtors (“NAR”) is the largest professional 
  
 1 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn et al., Bringing More Competition to Real Estate 
Brokerage, 35 REAL EST. L.J., Summer 2006, at 86-87; Lawrence J. White, The 
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition 
Look Like?, 35 REAL EST. L.J., Summer 2006, at 11, 14 (noting that typical residential 
real estate transactions “involve[] a sales/purchase price that is well into six figures, 
and seven-figure transactions are becoming commonplace in many areas”). 
 2 Eighty-five percent of homebuyers report using a real estate agent to locate 
properties at some point during their search. Karen Janisch, National Association of 
Realtors, Field Guide to Quick Real Estate Statistics, http://www.realtor.org/libweb.nsf/ 
pages/fg006 (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).  
 3 Agents advise sellers on their asking price, list their property for sale, 
advise them on selling strategies, market the property, and assist at closing. See, e.g., 
Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 91. 
 4 Ten percent of purchases result from dealings between a builder and 
purchaser directly, and only five percent of sales result from “for sale by owner” 
(“FSBO”) transactions. Janisch, supra note 2. 
 5 Residential Real Estate Brokerage Services: A Cockamamie System that 
Restricts Competition and Consumer Choice: Testimony Before the H. Financial Servs. 
Comm., and Housing & Community Opportunity Subcomm., 109th Cong. 1-2 (2006) 
(statement of Stephen Brobeck, Consumer Federation of America) [hereinafter Brobeck 
Testimony], available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_Executive_Director_ 
Brobeck_Testimony_on_Residential%20Real_Estate_Brokerage_Services.pdf.  
772 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
association in the world.6 The NAR’s membership is at its all 
time high, with approximately 1.3 million enrolled members.7  
Real estate agents exchange information regarding 
properties for sale through the Multiple Listing Service 
(“MLS”). The MLS, created over a hundred years ago, is a 
collective database of pooled real estate listings where brokers 
both list their clients’ properties for sale and browse the 
listings of other brokers.8 There are more than 900 MLSs 
operating across the United States today,9 most of which are 
owned and controlled by local chapters of the NAR.10 The MLS 
is widely recognized for increasing efficiency in the residential 
real estate market.11 The MLS decreases transaction costs for 
brokers by allowing them to access property listings for an 
entire region just by “pointing and clicking,” rather than 
having to spend time searching for “for sale” signs in 
neighborhoods.12 Additionally, the MLS has been applauded for 
increasing broker competition by allowing real estate agents of 
  
 6 National Association of Realtors, How to Join NAR, http://www.realtor.org/ 
realtororg.nsf/pages/HowtoJoin (July 6, 2007). 
 7 Id.; National Association of Realtors, About NAR, http://www.realtor.org/ 
about_nar/index.html (reporting 1,363,493 members as of July 31, 2007) (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2007).  
 8 White, supra note 1, at 15; see also Mariwyn Evans, What’s Next for the 
MLS?, REALTOR MAG. ONLINE, June 1, 2006, www.realtor.org/rmomag.NSF/pages/ 
feature3juno6?OpenDocument. 
 9 Evans, supra note 8.  
 10 See PATRICK WOODALL & STEVEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF 
AMERICA, NONTRADITIONAL REAL ESTATE BROKERS: GROWTH AND CHALLENGES 9 
(2006), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Nontraditonal_Real_Estate_Brokers-Growth_ 
and_Challenges.pdf; see also Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 96; American Homeowners 
Grassroots Alliance, Comments at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. 
Department of Justice Public Workshop on Competition Policy and the Real Estate 
Industry (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/realestatecompetition/ 
518795-00200.pdf. 
 11 See, e.g., Arthur D. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing 
Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1329-30 (1970); White, supra 
note 1, at 15 (noting that the MLS reduces the transaction costs for both the buyer and 
seller). 
 12 See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, Multiple Listing Services—Antitrust and 
Policy, REAL ESTATE L.J., Fall 2003, at 140, 140 (“Rather than having to ‘trawl 
neighborhoods’ for ‘For Sale’ signs as a means of discovering the available inventory in 
the housing market, realtors, sellers, and buyers can point, click and scroll to discover 
the market in Chandler, Arizona or Bar Harbor, Maine.” (citing Freeman v. San Diego 
Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003))); Evans, supra note 8 
(“[C]onsumers had to visit every brokerage office in town to be sure of seeing all 
available properties. Brokers had to spend hours negotiating cooperative agreements 
with other companies before showing a listing.” (describing the practice of a residential 
real estate broker before the advent of the MLS)).  
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different experience levels to compete in the same market.13 
Because of the dominance of the MLS, the Department of 
Justice describes real estate agent access to the MLS as 
“critical to compete in the local market.”14 The Fifth Circuit 
calls it “essential to a broker’s ability to compete effectively.”15 
So while the MLS undeniably increases efficiency in the real 
estate market, the overwhelming dominance of the MLS also 
creates a risk that those in control of it, “having assumed 
significant power in the market, [will] also assum[e] the power 
to exclude other competitors from access to its pooled 
resources.”16  
In fact, obtaining access to the MLS’s invaluable listings 
is often made conditional on the agent becoming a member of 
his or her state and local affiliate of the NAR17 as well as the 
  
 13 See, e.g., Oates v. E. Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 273 A.2d 
795, 797 n. 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971) (“[T]he MLS provides ‘the small office with 
inventory and promotion potentials equal to those of the larger firms . . . .’ ” (quoting 
James R. Pickett, Note, Arbitrary Exclusion from Multiple Listing: Common-Law and 
Statutory Remedies, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 570, 570 (1967) (internal citation omitted)). 
 14 Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Sues National 
Association of Realtors For Limiting Competition Among Real Estate Brokers (Sept.  
8, 2005) [hereinafter DOJ Sues NAR], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/2005/211008.pdf. 
 15 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 
1980); see also Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“Access to this multiple listing service is a necessity for real estate agents and 
appraisers in this area.”); Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 842 
(Cal. 1976) (noting the substantial market power of the local MLS, and stating that 
“[t]he problems of a nonmember of the board in competing against this colossus are 
manifest”); White, supra note 1, at 16 (noting that if a broker were not able to list on 
the MLS, he or she “would be at a substantial disadvantage.”). 
 16 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1370; see also White, supra note 1, at 16 
(“[T]he ability of the collective members of a MLS to exclude rivals, especially if those 
rivals are ‘mavericks’ who are price-cutters with respect to commissions, can be a 
powerful way of enforcing a high-fee structure and thus of maintaining the collective 
exercise of market power.”). 
 17 This Note will refer to state and local affiliates of the NAR as “Realtors 
Associations.” “Realtor” is the trademarked name for a real estate agent who is a 
member of the NAR. Although traditionally used to describe all brokers and agents, the 
NAR trademarked the term in 1947.  
  Some brokers and commentators believe that this is an illegal trademark. 
See, e.g., DAVID BARRY, NINE PILLARS OF THE CITADEL 39-44 (2005), available at 
http://www.barryfirm.com/dnld/Nine-Pillars-Citadel.pdf. (Barry is the pioneer of the 
“Open MLS” movement, advocating for public access of the MLS, and was lead attorney 
for three challenges to NAR practices in federal courts in 2006.) In one case, a plaintiff 
unsuccessfully challenged the Realtor trademark, complaining that she was injured 
after she withdrew from the Realtors association for being poorly treated and was no 
longer allowed to describe herself as a Realtor. Pope v. Miss. Real Estate Comm’n, 872 
F.2d 127, 128-29, 133 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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NAR itself.18 One study reports that eighty-four percent of the 
MLSs across the country require membership in a Realtors 
association in order to access the system.19 Each NAR member 
must pay significant dues to the organization each year and 
agree to abide by its code of conduct.20 Some brokers feel forced 
to join the NAR in order to access the MLS.21 These brokers 
may not agree with the practices of the NAR, and would prefer 
to join a trade organization that is better suited to their own 
practice.22 The NAR’s expansive membership and abundant 
resources gives the organization power in shaping the market 
for residential real estate.23 The NAR arguably uses this power 
to encourage dominance of the “traditional” model for 
brokerage, which in turn helps to maintain suspiciously high 
and constant commission rates for Realtors.24  
This Note argues that requiring real estate brokers to 
purchase memberships in a NAR-affiliated association in order 
to access the MLS should be illegal.25 First, it argues that 
  
 18 See, e.g., Glen Justice, Lobbying to Sell Your House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 12, 
2006, at C1. (“[The NAR] has an iron grip on its members. For access to property 
listings, individual agents and the brokers who employ them must belong to the 
national association and their state and local affiliates.”); see also BARRY, supra note 
17, at 25; Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 96-97. 
 19 BARRY, supra note 17, at 25. This statistic was obtained by hiring a 
consultant to survey the top 100 MLS markets in the United States to determine 
whether they required Realtors association memberships in order to access the MLS. 
The data were then verified by a forensic accounting firm. Id. at 24. 
 20 The plaintiff in one case spent $449 a year in annual dues in order to join 
the local, state, and national association of realtors in order to obtain MLS access. 
Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 21 See, e.g., Reifert, 450 F.3d at 315-16 (plaintiff real estate broker had “no 
desire” to maintain his membership in the local and national NAR, but maintained his 
membership in order to maintain his MLS access); Buyer’s Corner, 410 F. Supp 2d at 
577 (plaintiff alleged that she continued her Realtor’s Association membership solely in 
order to gain access to the MLS). 
 22 See Reifert, 450 F.3d at 315-16 (plaintiff, an “exclusive buyer’s agent,” and 
member of the National Association of Exclusive Buyer’s Agents, objected to being 
forced to comply with the NAR’s code of ethics in order to access the MLS); Buyer’s 
Corner, 410 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (plaintiff, an “exclusive buyer’s agent,” was a member 
of the National Association of Exclusive Buyer’s Agents and “believ[ed] that NAR and 
its affiliates are unethical because they permit real estate brokers to represent both the 
buyer and the seller in a single transaction.”). 
 23 See Michael K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Estate 
Brokerage Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 271, 303 (1992). 
 24 See discussion infra Part II.B and II.C. 
 25 Historically, real estate agents alleging various antitrust grounds have 
sought with varying degrees of success to invalidate this practice as an illegal restraint 
on free competition in the industry. See, e.g., Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 
F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (challenging the practice on alternate group boycott, 
tying, and monopolization theories); Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of 
Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 806 (1st Cir. 1988) (challenging the conditional membership 
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requiring brokers to join the NAR is an antitrust violation 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act26 on two separate theories: 
(1) as an illegal “tying” arrangement and (2) as a group 
boycott.27 Alternatively, this Note argues that absent a judicial 
remedy, state real estate commissions should adopt bright-line 
rules forbidding the practice for public policy reasons. However, 
because these commissions are often dominated by 
traditionalist Realtors,28 they may be unwilling to limit NAR 
power. Therefore, it may be necessary for state or federal 
legislatures to prohibit the practice. 
To understand how the NAR encourages preservation of 
the status quo in real estate brokerage, it is necessary to have 
a basic understanding of the nature of a broker’s role in the 
residential real estate transaction. Additionally, the fact-
intensive nature of antitrust analysis requires an 
understanding of the industry to which it is being applied. Part 
II.A provides this background; it describes both traditional and 
new brokerage models for residential real estate. Part II.B 
discusses the current state of competition in the residential 
real estate industry. Part II.C demonstrates how Realtors 
association arrangements requiring NAR-affiliated association 
membership in order to access an MLS negatively affect 
competition in the residential real estate industry. Part II.D 
describes real estate agent membership associations that cater 
to alternative brokers.  
  
requirement as an illegal tying arrangement); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 
629 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (5th Cir. 1980) (challenging an association’s membership 
requirements as overly restrictive). There has been a recent resurgence of litigation 
regarding the practice. Three recent federal court cases challenged the arrangement, 
although none was successful. Reifert, 450 F.3d at 316, 321); Prencipe v. Spokane Bd. of 
Realtors, No. CIV-04-0319-LRS, 2006 WL 1310402, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 2006); 
Buyer’s Corner, 410 F. Supp. 2d. at 577, 584.  
 26 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  
 27 A third possible theory, not discussed in this Note, is the essential facilities 
doctrine. The essential facilities doctrine is rooted in Section two of the Sherman Act. 
The doctrine forbids one competitor firm from controlling a facility “essential” to 
effective competition in the market and denying access to such facility to competitors 
when it is a service that cannot be easily duplicated. See, e.g., Montogomery County 
Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804, 817 (D. Md. 
1995). The Supreme Court has neither officially adopted nor repudiated the essential 
facilities doctrine. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 
U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004). No case attempting to apply the theory to this situation was 
found. 
 28 Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 323; see also Brobeck Testimony, supra 
note 5, at 8 (describing a study that found that nearly four fifths of all state 
commissioners are practicing real estate brokers—one-fourth of which work for the four 
largest real estate brokerage firms in the country).  
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Part III introduces the Sherman Act and the applicable 
tying and group boycott theories. That Part illuminates how 
the law in these areas has changed over time, how it continues 
to change, and its current posture. Part IV argues that the 
NAR should not be permitted to require real estate agents to 
join a Realtors association in order to access an MLS because it 
is a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act. Part V 
argues that the practice is an illegal group boycott under the 
Sherman Act. Part VI emphasizes that absent a judicial 
remedy, state real estate commissions or legislatures should 
create bright-line rules forbidding the arrangement.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Real Estate Agent’s Role in the Residential  
Real Estate Transaction 
1. The Traditional Brokerage Model  
In the traditional model for conducting a residential real 
estate transaction (also known as “full service brokerage”),29 the 
seller contracts with a broker to list his or her property for sale. 
The broker markets the property and helps the seller negotiate 
the deal.30 This broker is called the “listing agent.”31 The listing 
broker’s contract with the seller will usually be an “exclusive 
right to sell listing.”32 In an exclusive listing agreement, the 
seller agrees not to seek the services of another broker, which 
limits his or her dealings with buyers to only the one listing 
agent.33 Agency law governs the relationship between agents 
and their clients.34 Therefore, a real estate agent owes a 
fiduciary duty to his or her client, including the duties of 
loyalty and good faith.35  
  
 29 Brobeck Testimony, supra note 5, at 4.  
 30 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 31 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 91. 
 32 Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 272 (comparing the seller-beneficial 
dominant form of listing agreements of 60 years ago to today’s dominant “exclusive 
right to sell listing,” which favors brokers); Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 91 (“Home 
sellers are typically required to enter into an exclusive agreement with the agent 
trying to sell their home . . . .”). 
 33 See Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 91. 
 34 Katherine A. Pancak, Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, Real Estate 
Agency Reform: Meeting the Needs of Buyers, Sellers, and Brokers, REAL EST. L.J., 
Spring 1997, at 346-47. 
 35 Id. 
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Generally, the seller’s agreement with the listing broker 
requires the broker to list the seller’s property on the MLS.36 
All brokers with MLS access are then welcome to show the 
property to potential purchasers.37 The agents who show the 
property to buyers—called “selling brokers” or “cooperating 
brokers”—are traditionally considered a mandatory sub-agent 
of the seller.38 Therefore, under the traditional model, the 
broker who interacts with the buyer, showing them properties, 
is actually an agent of the seller. Accordingly, it is to the seller 
that the agent owes a fiduciary duty. The listing broker and the 
selling broker then split the commission, which the listing 
broker sets, and the buyer usually pays.39  
This arrangement clearly has negative implications for 
the buyer.40 A common buyer misconception is that the broker 
with whom they are working represents their interests.41 As a 
result, the NAR changed its policy to allow listing brokers to 
offer “cooperation and compensation” to selling brokers, rather 
than mandating a seller’s “sub agent” relationship.42 This rule 
allows selling brokers to enter into separate agency agreements 
with buyers.43 However, many agents desire to simultaneously 
represent the buyer and seller, acting as both the listing and 
the selling broker in order to retain the entire commission from 
the deal.44 This common practice, called “dual agency,” raises 
many of the same problems of the sub-agency relationship.45  
  
 36 Id. at 347. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id at 347-48.  
 39 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 91 (the listing broker splits their fee with the 
selling broker); RAY WILSON, BOUGHT, NOT SOLD: SINGLE AGENCY, BUYERS’ BROKERS, 
FLAT FEES, AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE 7 (1998) (the buyer pays 
the fee). While in theory, the commission is negotiable, in practice this is rarely the 
case. See, e.g., Amy Hoak, Do Your Homework Before Hiring a Real Estate Agent, 
THOMPSON FINANCIAL NEWS, Aug. 23, 2006. Some commentators argue that “fee-
splitting” will no longer be the norm if the industry becomes truly competitive; rather, 
buyers and sellers might compensate their individual brokers directly. E.g., White, 
supra note 1, at 27 (noting that the current arrangement might “be an incidental 
artifact of the current fixed-fee brokerage structure”). 
 40 See WILSON supra note 39, at 7. Wilson describes this system as “a picture 
with a patent and compound unfairness painted over—the fact that those paying for 
[the agent] not only were unrepresented, but led into trusting an agent of the other 
side as their own!” Id.  
 41 Id.; Pancak et al. supra note 34, at 349. 
 42 Pancak et al. supra note 34, at 352. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., White, supra note 1, at 16. 
 45 WILSON, supra note 39, at 6. Wilson describes the relationship as really 
one of “non agency” because adverse parties’ interests simply cannot be protected by 
the same person in a transaction. Id. Because this situation by its nature violates 
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Surveys and studies, including an Federal Trade 
Commission study examining the residential real estate 
industry in 1983, show that buyers often believe that the 
selling broker represents them.46 As a result of these studies, 
almost all states passed “disclosure laws” that require real 
estate agents to inform their clients who they represent.47 
Similarly, the NAR Code of Ethics now requires an agent who 
represents both the buyer and the seller in a transaction to 
disclose the potential conflict.48 Nevertheless, recent reports 
note that the required disclosure does not happen as frequently 
as it should.49 A study by the NAR found that one in five buyers 
did not sign a disclosure agreement, and one in five did not 
know if they had.50 A quarter of first time buyers said they did 
not sign one.51  
Thus, under the traditional model for real estate 
brokerage, the buyer’s interests are not sufficiently represented 
during negotiations. Furthermore, buyers are often unaware 
that the broker showing them properties does not represent 
them. Even new agency disclosure laws do not ensure that 
buyers are aware which party to the transaction the broker is 
really representing. 
  
traditional agency law, special legislation has been enacted to allow the practice. The 
NAR has recommended and lobbied for such “designated agency” statutes, and state 
Realtors associations have drafted model provisions. Thomas Early, Comments at 
Competition Policy and the Real Estate Industry Conference, hosted by the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/213172.pdf. This system also 
sometimes further contributes to agents setting higher standard commission rates and 
refusing to deal with agents on the other side of the transaction who charge a lower 
rate. White, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
 46 See Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 281-83. 
 47 Panacek et al., supra note 34, at 353. 
 48 CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, Standard of Practice 1-5 (2006) [hereinafter NAR CODE], 
available at http://www.realtor.org/mempolweb.nsf/pages/2006code (“[Realtors] may 
represent the seller/landlord and buyer/tenant in the same transaction only after full 
disclosure to and with informed consent of both parties.”). 
 49 Hoak, supra note 39; see also Kenneth R. Harney, Agents Falling Short on 
Disclosure, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at F1 (stating that new NAR research shows 
that only thirty percent of buyers in 2005 received disclosures). Some advocates argue 
that in addition to being required to disclose the dual agency nature of the relationship, 
real estate agents should have to disclose to buyers that exclusive buyer agency is an 
option available to them. See, e.g., Early, supra note 46. 
 50 Hoak, supra note 39. 
 51 Id. 
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2. New Brokerage Models  
Consumer demand and changing technology have 
resulted in the development of new service models for real 
estate brokerage.52 The growing dominance of the Internet in 
society has increased public access to information and created 
pressure for the broker’s role in the real estate transaction to 
change.53 As a result, new brokers sometimes “unbundle” 
brokerage services by allowing clients to pick and choose the 
specific services traditionally included in full-service brokerage 
that they want.54 Clients can then pay a lower commission rate 
based on which services they use.55 This a la carte model caters 
to consumers of varying sophistication levels who desire 
different levels of service and do not necessarily require all of 
the services of a traditional real estate broker.56 These brokers 
might provide very limited services, such as simply listing their 
clients’ property for sale on the MLS for a flat fee.57 Although a 
seller using a flat-fee listing broker will probably still need to 
offer the selling broker a commission to bring in a buyer, the 
seller could still save almost fifty percent over what he or she 
would need to pay under the traditional model.58 
Another new type of broker is the exclusive buyer’s 
agent. As a result of rising consumer awareness regarding the 
problem of dual agency, these agents are becoming more 
popular.59 More homebuying guides and other mainstream 
media outlets are recommending that buyers consider using a 
  
 52 See, e.g., WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 2, 4 (noting that, as 
housing prices and commissions grew, consumers demanded different pricing options 
and, as dual agency was “exposed,” consumers increasingly sought out exclusive buyer 
agents); Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 97-101 (discussing how the internet has affected 
and will continue to affect real estate brokerage). 
 53 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 97-99. Traditionally, a major role of the broker 
was to locate the property for a buyer—now that consumers can access many listings 
online themselves, it is questionable whether this service is necessary. WOODALL & 
BROBECK, supra note 10, at 5. 
 54 See, e.g., American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, supra note 10. 
 55 Id. 
 56 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 5. 
 57 Consumers cannot post their property themselves because they are not 
licensed real estate agents and cannot join a Realtors association; thus, they cannot 
access the MLS. Brobeck Testimony, supra note 5, at 5. 
 58 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 99. 
 59 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 7 (“Membership in the National 
Association of Exclusive Buyer Agents tripled over the past decade rising from 221 in 
1995 to over 700 in 2006.”). 
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broker exclusive to their side of the transaction.60 These agents 
market themselves as trustworthy alternatives to the 
traditional real estate agent who genuinely work for their 
clients’ best interests.61 Exclusive buyers’ agents do not accept 
any listings, ensuring that they will avoid the inevitable 
conflict of interest that arises when a buyer client wants to buy 
the house of a selling client.62  
A third new type of agent acts solely as a “lead 
generator” for other agents.63 These lead generators assess the 
needs of a given customer and match them with an appropriate 
agency.64 The referred agencies then give part of their 
commissions to the “lead generator.”65 The “lead generator” 
then passes part of this commission on to the consumer as a 
rebate.66 Thus, the consumer is ultimately paying less in 
commission than under the traditional model. 
These new brokerage models continue to develop and 
grow in popularity, enhancing consumer choice. As a result, 
consumers are able to pay less for brokerage services that are 
better tailored to their needs.  
B. Competition in the Residential Real Estate Industry 
The Consumer Federation of America recently called the 
residential real estate industry “the last remaining 
unregulated cartel functioning in America.”67 This statement is 
just one small part of a resurgence of debate over the 
anticompetitive conditions in the residential real estate 
  
 60 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 39, at 76; David Devoss, Don’t Assume 
Anything, and Nine Other Home-Buying Tips; Hire Pros But Learn Ins, Outs: Prune 
Price, Payments and Problems by Choosing the Best Ways and Times to Buy, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 14, 2006, at A5; Top Things to Know, CNNMONEY, June 
18, 2006 (“Look for an exclusive buyer agent, if possible, who will have your interests at 
heart and can help you with strategies during the bidding process.”). 
 61 See, e.g., The National Association of Exclusive Buyer’s Agents Home Page, 
http://www.naeba.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2007); Jane Becker, Home Team 
AdvantEdge, Before You Start Your Home Search, Find Out What You Need to Know 
About Real Estate Agency, http://www.hometeamadvantedge.com/homebuying.html 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007). 
 62 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 4. 
 63 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 98-99. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Group Decries Real Estate “Cartel,” L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at C6. 
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industry.68 Discussion of the problem, however, is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, the last half century has seen much 
similar debate, flush with both private and government 
litigation challenging various anticompetitive practices in the 
industry.69 Several features of the real estate market that have 
troubled commentators remain today: broker commission rates 
have remained steadily high over time;70 the traditional model 
for brokerage remains dominant even in a climate of 
alternative models for brokerage arguably more attractive to 
consumers;71 and control of the MLS, an indispensable tool of 
the trade, remains largely in the hands of one trade 
association.72  
Even as housing prices have changed over time and 
technological advances have arguably made the broker’s job 
easier, commission rates in the industry have remained 
  
 68 See id. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice held a large 
conference on competition in the Real Estate Industry in October 2005, seeking input 
from various real estate professionals and academics, as well as the public. See Public 
Workshops, Antitrust Division, Competition Policy and the Real Estate Industry, 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/reworkshop.htm; Press Release, Department of 
Justice, Justice Department/Federal Trade Commission to Host Joint Workshop on 
Competition Policy and the Real Estate Industry (Sept. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/211074.pdf. The Summer 2006 
edition of the Real Estate Law Journal was devoted to an exploration of the problem. 
See, e.g., Hahn et al., supra note 1; White, supra note 1; John C. Weicher, The Price of 
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Services: A Review of the Evidence, Such as It Is, 
REAL EST. L.J., Summer 2006, at 119. Also, in 2006, three separate district courts 
across the country heard cases that challenged the Realtors associations’ practice of 
requiring membership in the NAR to access the MLS. See supra note 25.  
 69 See, e.g., Norman W. Hawker, Overview of AAI’s Real Estate Competition 
Project: Highlights from the Existing Literature on Broker Competition, REAL EST. L.J., 
Summer 2006 at 69-71 (noting that “competition issues in this industry have been a 
major concern for the last half century,” and providing a comprehensive review of 
judicial decisions and government publications on the subject); see also Unites States v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1950) (holding that the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards violated federal antitrust law by creating a formal 
schedule for commission rates); Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of 
Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 815 (1st Cir. 1988) (upholding the requirement that an agent 
join the Realtors association in order to access the MLS based on a finding that a 
substantial amount of commerce was not foreclosed as required by the Sherman Act); 
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1389 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(invalidating some MLS membership criteria as an unreasonable group boycott under 
the Sherman Act); Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Plasson, 549 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1976) 
(invalidating an association’s membership requirement under state antitrust law).  
 70 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
 71 See supra Part II.A.2 
 72 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text and discussion infra Part 
II.C.1. 
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remarkably steady at around five to six percent.73 Such stable 
commission rates have led analysts to question whether there 
is some kind of “informal collusion” keeping commission rates 
at this level.74 In fact, the traditional model does give a direct 
economic incentive to the listing and the selling broker to 
cooperate in maintaining a high commission rate because they 
will split the commission when the deal closes.75 Even worse, 
the traditional model allows one broker to represent both sides 
of the transaction.76 A dual agent clearly has an incentive to 
maintain the high commission rate because she will retain the 
entire fee.77 Alternative brokerage models, on the other hand, 
offer consumers the opportunity to choose limited services for 
discount rates.78 
Some commentators, however, argue that the 
dominance of the traditional model for brokerage suppresses 
the growth of alternative brokerage models. These 
commentators note that the “commonality of the structure [for 
brokerage services] . . . and its persistence over time suggest 
the possibility that alternative models have not had a fair 
chance to compete.”79 Since the traditional brokerage method 
allows little opportunity for the consumer to negotiate the 
broker’s commission rate, alternative brokers have complained 
that consumers do not even know that they can shop around for 
different service packages and rates.80 Additionally, 
discrimination against alternative brokers by traditionalist 
brokers may contribute to the limited growth of these types of 
brokers.81 Traditional brokers do not want the industry to be 
infiltrated by brokers offering lower prices.82 Therefore, 
  
 73 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 2; White, supra note 1, at 12. This 
commission rate is approximately 1.5% higher than that found in other developed 
countries. American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, supra note 10. 
 74 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 92-93. 
 75 For this reason, commentators sometimes describe the traditional model as 
one of “interdependence.” The system encourages cooperation and interdependence 
between brokers, in order to maintain a uniform high commission rate. Braswell & Poe, 
supra note 23, at 318.  
 76 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
 77 Critics call this practice a “double dip.” The same effect can be achieved 
through “in-house” transactions whereby two brokers in the same brokerage firm 
represent the buyer and the seller. In this case, the entire commission profit accrues to 
the one brokerage. Early, supra note 45. 
 78 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 79 Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 92.  
 80 See Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 315. 
 81 See Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 90; see also infra Part II.C.2. 
 82 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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traditionalists have an economic incentive to deal only with 
other traditionalists who work for the same standard 
commission rate.83 
Analysts speculate that a truly competitive residential 
real estate industry would feature lower commission rates and 
“a greater range and variety of services [offered] at varying 
prices.”84 Therefore, expansion and growth of the new 
alternative models for real estate brokerage should be 
encouraged. 
C. The NAR Actively Stifles the Development of Alternative 
Models of Real Estate Brokerage 
Rather than encouraging development of new brokerage 
models, the NAR and its local affiliates rigorously support the 
traditional model for real estate brokerage.85 The NAR 
aggressively lobbies for legislation that ensures the dominance 
of the traditional model for brokerage.86 In fact, the general 
counsel of the NAR has made it clear that this is the NAR’s 
agenda, stating recently that “Realtor associations have the 
right to lobby for legislative and regulatory action that they 
support—even if the effect of such action would be anti-
competitive.”87  
The NAR receives a vast amount of funding to pursue 
its lobbying activities through annual membership dues 
collected from its 1.3 million members. Membership dues 
generate around $100 million annually.88 In its 2005 annual 
report, the NAR stated that it used fifteen percent of 
  
 83 Id. 
 84 White, supra note 1, at 13. 
 85 The NAR and its local affiliates actively lobby for local legislation aimed at 
maintaining the traditional system for residential real estate. See, e.g., WILSON, supra 
note 39, at 191; American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, supra note 10. Such 
legislation includes “minimum service laws,” requiring all real estate brokers to 
provide a certain level of service to their clients—aimed at limiting the level of service 
provided by discount brokers. Brobeck Testimony, supra note 5, at 4. Such laws might 
require, for example, “all service providers to maintain physical offices or accompany 
prospective buyers on home visits.” Id. 
 86 See Justice, supra note 18 (“The Realtors association is . . . one of the most 
powerful lobbies in Washington, spending nearly $94 million annually.”); see also supra 
note 45 and accompanying text, discussing “designated agency” laws. 
 87 Id. 
 88 National Association of Realtors, Internal Revenue Service Form I-990 
Filing, at 1, available at www.guidestar.org (Line 3, Membership Dues and 
Assessments lists $94,651,631 in membership fees for the tax year 2004). 
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membership dues for “public policy.”89 Therefore, by forcing all 
real estate agents wishing to access the MLS to pay 
membership dues to the NAR, all real estate agents are in 
effect contributing money to be used in part to lobby against 
competitive changes in the industry. This is especially 
problematic for alternative brokers, who would probably prefer 
not to contribute to a fund that will be used in part to advocate 
for policies adverse to their interests. 
The NAR and traditional brokers, however, have a great 
incentive to continue to advocate for adherence to the status 
quo in brokerage because any break in uniformity is likely to 
result in lower commission rates.90 Additionally, the NAR 
clearly has strong incentives to require membership in the 
NAR in order for a broker to obtain MLS access—millions of 
dollars to use in forwarding its traditionalist agenda and the 
power to control who uses the MLS and on what terms.91  
1. NAR Power over MLS Terms of Use Stifles Growth  
of Alternative Brokerage Models 
By requiring membership in a Realtors association in 
order to access the MLS, the NAR controls the MLS’s terms of 
use.92 Moreover, when an agent joins the NAR, they must agree 
to abide by the NAR’s Code of Ethics. These rules and 
standards are often criticized for stifling the development and 
expansion of alternative business models.93 For example, the 
Code-mandated arbitration process for settling commission 
disputes is often criticized.94 The panels that conduct the 
arbitration hearings largely consist of traditionalist NAR 
member brokers who themselves compete with the brokers 
involved in the disputes.95 Therefore, these arbitrators have 
  
 89 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2006), 
available at http://www.realtor.org/realtororg.nsf/pages/2005_annual_report. 
 90 See Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 101.  
 91 Brobeck Testimony, supra note 5, at 7. 
 92 One commentator describes the potential problem with this arrangement 
in this way: “[F]or most MLSs, the terms are coordinated through NAR’s national 
policy, and they can design it to keep membership limited to firms who will conduct 
their business in a particular manner.” Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 96. The NAR 
argues that membership in the association is necessary in order to regulate the MLS, 
and ensure that brokers are interacting ethically. One counterargument is that this is 
the duty of state licensing boards and real estate commissions—not a private trade 
association. Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 307-08. 
 93 See, e.g., Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 305-06. 
 94 NAR CODE, supra note 48, art. 17. 
 95 Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 305-06.  
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little incentive to find in favor of a non-traditionalist broker 
whose practice is threatening to break up the status quo in real 
estate brokerage, potentially reducing commission rates.96 
Additionally, in arbitration, the NAR uses the doctrine 
of “procuring cause” to settle commission disputes.97 Under 
procuring cause, a commission belongs to the broker whose 
“unbroken efforts . . . were responsible for the buyer making the 
decision to consummate the sale on terms which the seller 
found acceptable.”98 Use of this doctrine can jeopardize an 
alternative broker’s right to his or her commission.99 For 
example, buyers often begin their home search on their own 
today, perhaps searching for properties online. However, NAR 
policy ensures that pared-down online listings, unlike those in 
the Realtor-accessible MLS, do not contain enough information 
for a buyer to locate a property and contact the seller directly.100 
When an interested buyer calls the number on the listing, the 
buyer speaks with the listing broker, who will give the buyer 
more information or possibly show the property.101 At this point, 
if the buyer is interested in the property and contacts a buyers-
only broker to help negotiate the transaction, the buyers-only 
broker might be locked out of the commission since, technically, 
the listing broker is the agent who “originated the series of 
events leading to the closing.”102 This doctrine, perpetuated by 
  
 96 Id. (describing this condition as “add[ing] significantly to the general 
pressures of uniformity” (quoting FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, THE 
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 126 (1983)).  
 97 NAR CODE, supra note 48, art. 17, Standard of Practice 17-4. 
 98 National Association of Realtors, Procuring Cause Factors, available at 
http://www.realtor.org (search “procause.doc” and download Word file) (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2007).  
 99 See Early, supra note 45, at *4. 
 100 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 10; Brobeck Testimony, supra 
note 5, at 5. 
 101 See WILSON, supra note 39, at 227-28 (warning buyers who want to work 
with an exclusive buyers agent that such agents “do not make specific appointments to 
see houses; do not visit listing agencies; and do not let listing agents escort you to 
houses; visit only during declared ‘open house’ hours when the homes are specifically 
open for general viewing”). 
 102 See National Association of Realtors, Procuring Cause—An Introduction, 
available at www.realtor.org (search “pcai.doc” and download Word file) (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2007); see also WILSON, supra note 39, at 227 (“[Y]our visit to a home which 
eventually emerges as a purchase possibility could become the basis for a listing 
agent’s claim to be the procuring cause of your interest and, therefore, entitled to the 
buyerside portion of the commission.”). 
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the NAR, clearly encourages maintaining the traditional model 
of real estate brokerage.103 
NAR policy is also discriminatory to online-based 
brokers. The NAR enacted rules that allow NAR members to 
withhold their listings from being displayed on the site of an 
online broker if they so choose.104 Thus, the NAR’s control over 
access to and terms of use of the MLS has discriminatory 
effects on alternative real estate brokers and may stifle the 
growth of these new forms of brokerage.  
2. Realtors Associations Discriminate Against 
Alternative Brokers 
In addition to the discriminatory effects caused by 
Realtor control of the MLS, Realtors associations do not 
generally foster an environment that supports or encourages 
the development of new models for real estate brokerage. In its 
code of ethics, the NAR states, “[Realtors] urge exclusive 
representation of clients; do not attempt to gain any unfair 
advantage over their competitors; and they refrain from 
making unsolicited comments about other practitioners.”105 
However, in practice, Realtors do not seem to adhere to this 
policy. Discount brokers frequently complain that they are 
harassed or treated otherwise unfairly by Realtors.106 Buyers-
only brokers report similar harassment by traditionalist NAR 
members.107  
One common complaint of alternative brokers is that 
traditional agents practice “steering.”108 Steering occurs when 
  
 103 Efforts are being made by exclusive buyer agents to educate the consumer 
to this fact so that they know they need to start with an exclusive buyer agent from the 
beginning of their home search process. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 39, at 227-28; 
Becker, supra note 61. 
 104 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed suit in September 2005 against 
the NAR over their rules governing website listings. The NAR allows NAR members to 
withhold their listings from being displayed on the websites of on-line brokers. The 
DOJ claims that this is a restraint on trade aimed at restraining competition from 
discount brokers. This case is currently in the discovery phase. DOJ Sues NAR, supra 
note 14, at 2-3; see also Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 88. 
 105 NAR Code, supra note 48, Preamble. 
 106 Braswell & Poe, supra note 23, at 315. Brokers have been largely 
unsuccessful in suits alleging such harassment by mainstream brokers, primarily 
because courts have found that the actions were perpetuated by a few brokers 
individually, not by the NAR or local affiliates as a whole. See, e.g., Market Force Inc. 
v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 906 F.2d 1167, 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 107 See infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. 
 108 White, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
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traditional listing brokers make it difficult or impossible for 
non-traditional or “discount” brokers to bring potential buyers 
to the property.109 Another complaint is that traditional selling 
brokers sometimes refuse to show a buyer property listed by a 
broker who works for less than a six percent commission.110 
Additionally, some traditional brokers create an environment 
unfriendly to alternative brokers by making disparaging 
remarks about non-traditional brokers in the media, through 
advertising to homebuyers and sellers and at Realtors work-
shops.111 During the 2003 NAR convention, for example, 
discount brokers were referred to as “waging war on real estate 
commissions.”112 At this conference, a video was screened that 
morphed the face of one well-known discount broker into that 
of Osama Bin Laden.113  
Thus, despite the NAR’s professed commitment to the 
equal treatment of brokers, reports of harassment and unequal 
treatment from alternative brokers paint a different picture.  
D. Alternative Real Estate Associations in Competition  
with the NAR 
Alternative real estate professional membership 
associations have developed to cater to the expanding pool of 
non-traditional brokers. One of the largest alternative 
associations is the National Association of Exclusive Buyers 
Agents (“NAEBA”), whose members represent only the buyer in 
a transaction.114 The National Association of Real Estate 
  
 109 See id.  
 110 One flat-fee listing agent complained that a traditional agent refused to 
show his homes because of his lower commission rate, stating that the traditional 
broker told him, “Sorry, I don’t give discount services, so I don’t discount my 
commission. But if the seller is willing to do 3 percent I’ll show the property. That is 
pretty standard for real estate professionals.” WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 11, at 
11-12.  
 111 One buyers-only broker (also a member of the NAR) alleges that while 
attending a Task Force of Buyer Agency Liability, the former NAR president, Sharon 
Millett “was openly hostile and rude every time [she] tried to add [her] view to the 
discussion.” E-mail from Janet Hagan, The Buyer’s Voice in Real Estate, to the 
Department of Justice (Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Hagan e-mail], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/213325.pdf. Similarly, a well-
respected member of the NAR Professional Standards Committee who spoke at the 
event called the NAEBA “radical insurgents.” Id. 
 112 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 10, at 15 (quoting Jessica Swesy, Fear 
Still Rules Real Estate Industry, INMAN NEWS, Feb. 24, 2006). 
 113 Id. 
 114 See National Association of Exclusive Buyers Agents, http://www.naeba.org 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2007). There are also many local exclusive buyers agent 
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Consultants is an association representing flat-fee brokers.115 A 
new trade association, the American Real Estate Broker 
Alliance (“AREBA”) was formed in 2006 to cater to flat-fee and 
discount brokers.116 Although alternative agents are not 
excluded from joining the NAR (the NAR explicitly states that 
it “encourages innovation and competition in real estate 
brokerage, including different business models like fee-for-
service”),117 they often report being harassed and poorly treated 
by traditional Realtors.118 Therefore, it is no surprise that these 
agents might prefer not to join the NAR. Additionally, it is 
likely that more agents would join an alternative association if 
they were not already “forced” to pay two or three membership 
fees (that is, the NAR and a local and state NAR affiliate) in 
order to access the MLS.119 
Real estate agents should not be forced to join an 
association they do not wish to join, especially if they object to 
the organization’s practices on ethical grounds. In an age of 
consumer distrust of real estate agents120 and widespread 
awareness of issues regarding representation,121 it might be 
competitively beneficial for real estate agents to not identify 
themselves as traditional Realtors. Agents marketing 
themselves as an exclusive buyers agents separate from the 
NAR, for example, might attract a different consumer niche.  
  
associations. See, e.g., Colorado Exclusive Buyer Agents Association, http:// 
www.homebuyerscolorado.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); New Hampshire Association 
of Exclusive Buyer Agents, http://www.nhaeba.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).  
 115 WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 11, at 7. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Real Estate Commission Debate Heats Up, REALTOR MAG. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 
2006, http://www.realtor.org/rmodaily.nsf/pages/News2006110707?OpenDocument. 
 118 See, e.g., Hagan e-mail, supra note 111 (claiming that she has been paying 
dues to the NAR since 1988, but her name is not listed on the NAR website); see also 
supra Part II.C.  
 119 For example, in Thompson, there was evidence showing that “the expense 
of dual membership in trade groups can be prohibitive for some brokers, and . . . 
prospective . . . members [of Empire, an alternative real estate professional association] 
did not join Empire . . . because of the prohibitive cost. Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, 
Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1578 (11th Cir. 1991); see also discussion infra Part II.A.; BARRY, 
supra note 17, at 26 (showing agent “non-join” rates in areas where joining a Realtors 
association not required to access the MLS).  
 120 Real estate agent is ranked fairly low on a scale of “trustworthy” 
professions in Gallup polls. In a 2000 Gallup poll, only seventeen percent of 
respondents ranked real estate agents as “high” or “very high” on a standard of honesty 
and ethics. Blanche Evans, How Do You Interpret the Gallup Poll’s Ranking of Real 
Estate Agents?, REALTY TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, http://realtytimes.com/rtapages/ 
20001130_ranking.htm.  
 121 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, as new brokerage models continue to grow, it is 
likely that more broker-specific associations will develop. So 
long as the NAR is allowed to require membership in a 
Realtors association in order to access the MLS, however, the 
practice will constitute a barrier to entry for competitors. 
III. INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST LAWS APPLICABLE TO THE 
NAR’S CONTROL OF THE MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE 
The NAR’s control of the MLS and the resulting 
anticompetitive consequences might fall within the scope of 
antitrust laws. Antitrust laws are generally concerned with 
fostering competition in the marketplace. The theory is that 
unrestricted buyers and sellers in a free market will result in 
the most efficient distribution of resources.122 The primary 
economic purpose of antitrust laws is to “maximize consumer 
economic welfare”123 by creating an efficient market resulting in 
the “lowest prices, the highest quality, and greatest material 
progress . . . .”124 A secondary beneficiary of antitrust law is the 
competitor himself, who is assured a fair chance at competing 
in the marketplace.125 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, one piece 
of antitrust legislation, states “Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to 
be illegal.”126  
Courts have invalidated several anticompetitive 
business practices under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but 
only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited under the 
Act.127 One practice found to violate Section 1 is “tying 
arrangements.”128 A tying arrangement occurs when a seller 
will “sell one product . . . only on the condition that the buyer 
  
 122 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Arthur I. 
Cantor, Tying, Exclusive Dealing, and Franchising Issues, in 47TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST 
LAW INSTITUTE, at 399, 405 (P.L.I. Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook 
Series, 2006). 
 123 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 103 (1st ed. 
1978).  
 124 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4. 
 125 Id. 
 126 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 127 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 88 (1911).  
 128 Cantor, supra note 122, at 405-06. One commentator describes tying law as 
“among the most controversial of antitrust principles.” Stephen v. Bomse, Tying 1992: 
Waiting for Kodak to Develop, in 33RD ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, at 869, 872, 
P.L.I. Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 776, 1992). 
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also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees 
that he will not purchase that product from any other 
supplier.”129 The desired product is called the “tying” product, 
and the secondary product is the “tied” product. Tying 
arrangements are subject to inquiry under the Sherman Act 
when the seller is either “an actual monopolist of the tying 
product or an actual or prospective monopolist of the tied 
product.”130 Tying arrangements restrain trade not only by 
affecting competition between existing competitors, but also by 
barring entry to new firms in the market.131 This effect is 
achieved because the monopolist seller of the tying product 
effectively extends their monopoly to the tied product.132  
A second practice scrutinized under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act is a “group boycott,” or “concerted refusal to 
deal.”133 A group boycott occurs when a group of competitors 
collectively agree not to deal with a competitor or group of 
competitors who are not a member of the group.134 As part of 
the boycott, the nonmember might be denied access to a 
“valuable business service” that it needs in order to be 
competitively effective.135  
Traditionally, both tying arrangements and group 
boycotts were frequently invalidated, and courts often found 
each of them illegal per se.136 The strict per se rule resulted 
from the common early belief that both tying arrangements 
and concerted refusals to deal had a “pernicious effect on 
competition” and lacked any “redeeming virtue.”137 Since these 
  
 129 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5-6. The most recent Supreme Court tying cases 
continue to use this definition of tying. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992). 
 130 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ANTITRUST LAW § 17.01e (3d ed. Supp. 2004). 
 131 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 
(1959). 
 134 Id. at 212. 
 135 Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963). 
 136 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (listing 
group boycotts and tying arrangements as among the practices “deemed to be unlawful 
in and of themselves”). 
 137 Id. In another case, the Court noted that “tying arrangements generally 
serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive 
way.” Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969); see 
also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 617 (1977) 
(noting that permitting tying arrangements was like condoning “the existence of power 
that a free market [will] not tolerate”). Tying arrangements would be invalidated so 
long as the seller had enough market power in the tying product market to restrain 
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arrangements were considered facially unreasonable, the Court 
applied the per se rule to avoid an “incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation . . . so often wholly fruitless 
when undertaken.”138 
Critics have since argued that the per se rule sweeps too 
broadly and condemns practices that do not actually have 
negative competitive consequences.139 Critics claimed that the 
rule was based too much on assumptions rather than actual 
market analysis.140 These commentators shifted their view of 
tying arrangements and refusals to deal, and they now urge 
that there can be significant pro-competitive effects of such 
practices.141 As a result of changing attitudes, courts have 
begun to import more economic analysis into determinations  
of whether the per se rule should apply, focusing more on  
the actual market conditions and less on assumptions.142 
Application of the less stringent “rule of reason” analysis is 
becoming the new standard for analysis of both tying 
arrangements and group boycotts.143 The rule of reason  
requires courts to invalidate “any restraint whose anti-
competitive effects outweigh its contributions to competition.”144 
There are two steps to the rule of reason analysis: courts must  
(1) determine that the challenged firm possesses sufficient 
  
trade in the market for the tied product. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 499. Additionally, the 
tying arrangement must have had an effect on more than an “insubstantial amount of 
interstate commerce.” Id. Courts have traditionally inferred market power if the seller 
controlled a large share of the market. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992). These courts also held the amount of interstate 
commerce affected to be “not insubstantial” if it was more than “de minimis.” Fortner I, 
394 U.S. at 501. 
 138 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5. 
 139 The Department of Justice stance on tying arrangements is now that they 
“generally do not have a significant anticompetitive potential.” Bomse, supra note 128, 
at 875 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES ¶ 5.1 
(1985), but noting that the Guidelines were rescinded in 1993). Areeda states that most 
litigated tie-ins do not actually affect a substantial share of the tied market, yet most 
courts nevertheless condemn them. He argues that this is the area of tying law “most 
in need of reform.” 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1730 (1991). In United 
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., the Fifth Circuit refused to invalidate a group boycott 
using the per se rule, acknowledging the many possible pro-competitive effects of the 
arrangement. 629 F.2d 1351, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 140 See e.g. AREEDA, supra note 139. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35 (2006) (“Over 
the years . . . this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially 
diminished. Rather than relying on assumptions, in its more recent opinions the Court 
has required a showing of market power in the tying product.”).  
 143 See id. 
 144 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1370.  
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market power to justify analysis of its practice and (2) consider 
whether there are pro-competitive justifications for the practice 
that outweigh the possible anticompetitive effects.145  
IV. REQUIRING A REAL ESTATE AGENT TO JOIN A REALTORS 
ASSOCIATION IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE MLS 
IS AN ILLEGAL TYING ARRANGEMENT146 
A. The Applicable Standard for Tying Claims 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not 
entirely rejected the per se rule for tying arrangements,147 the 
extent of economic analysis now required just to decide 
whether the per se rule applies greatly limits its reach.148 An 
  
 145 See, e.g., Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 842-44 
(Cal. 1976) (“[W]e hesitate before mechanically applying a per se rule. Adopting such a 
rule would establish the activities of the board to be illegal without any regard to their 
economic effects or possible justification.”). 
 146 It should be noted that it is important that the plaintiff challenging the 
Realtors association practice have standing to bring the claim. In one unsuccessful case 
in 2006, a plaintiff’s claim was dismissed on the grounds that she failed to show that 
she suffered an antitrust injury. Buyer’s Corner Realty, Inc. v. N. Ky. Ass’n of Realtors, 
410 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d, 198 F. App’x 485 (6th Cir. 2007). In this 
case, the plaintiff broker, a member of both the NAR and the NAEBA, alleged that the 
only reason she joined the NAR was to access the MLS. Id. at 577. Because the plaintiff 
had in fact joined the NAEBA despite the NAR membership requirement, she failed to 
show how she was injured by the practice. Id. at 580. 
  In contrast, in Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, one of the plaintiffs 
was an alternative real estate professional association alleging a loss in membership 
due to the tying arrangement, and the other plaintiff was an agent who had applied to 
for MLS access but was denied because he refused to join the Realtors association. 
Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc. 934 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991). Both 
plaintiffs were deemed to have standing. Id. at 1571, 1572. With regards to the 
individual broker, the court concluded that “[a]s long as a plaintiff made a reasonable 
attempt to enter the market . . . the plaintiff has standing to contest antitrust 
violations which create barriers to that market.” Id. at 1572. 
 147 In Jefferson Parish, the court had the opportunity once again to reject the 
per se rule, but the majority chose to sustain it, stating that “[i]t is far too late in the 
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying 
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are 
unreasonable ‘per se.’” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984). 
 148 Ironically, one of the very purposes of the original per se rule was to “avoid 
a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood 
of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining 
whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive behavior.” Id. at 16; see 
also Cantor, supra note 122, at 410-11; Smith Machinery Co. v. Hesston Corp., 1987-1 
Trade Cas. ¶ 67,563 n.5 (D.N.M. 1987), aff’d, 878 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The 
means for deciding which tying agreements are ‘plainly anticompetitive’ enough to 
justify per se treatment has become so complex and difficult that the objectives of the 
per se rule are no longer being realized through its use.”); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35 (2006) (“Over the years . . . this Court’s strong disapproval of 
tying arrangements has substantially diminished. Rather than relying on assumptions, 
in its more recent opinions the Court has required a showing of market power in the 
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essential characteristic of modern-day tying analysis is 
“leverage.”149 To qualify as leverage, a seller must use its power 
in the market for the tying product to essentially force the 
consumer to purchase a tied product that they “either did not 
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on 
different terms.”150 The per se rule will only be applied when 
the seller’s market power in the tying product market is 
substantial enough such that forcing is probable.151 Courts 
conduct a fact-intensive analysis of the circumstances in each 
case.152 Some factors courts consider include whether the seller 
possesses a predominant share of the market for the tying 
product,153 whether the tying product is so unique that 
competitors are unable to offer it,154 and the cross-elasticity of 
demand for the tying product.155  
Additionally, the per se rule requires that the 
arrangement results in the substantial foreclosure of sales in 
the market for the tied product.156 An amount will be considered 
substantial when it is more than de minimis.157 The relevant 
figure is the total amount of sales tied by the arrangement 
being challenged, not just the amount attributable to the 
plaintiff challenging the practice.158 At least one circuit court 
has found that an amount of just over $10,000 was more than 
  
tying product.”). Illinois Tool Works ended the practice of automatic presumption of 
market power in cases involving a patented product. It did not however, reject the per 
se rule completely, and is the most recent Supreme Court consideration of the issue. Id. 
at 42, 43. 
 149 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.  
 150 Id. It should be noted that Illinois Tool Works is sometimes cited as 
abrogating Jefferson Parish. However, the case only reversed Jefferson Parish on one 
point of law, holding that the existence of a patent does not automatically implicate the 
per se rule for tying. 
 151 Id. at 16. 
 152 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-
67 (1992) (“This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, 
focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record.’”). 
 153 In Jefferson Parish, a thirty percent share of the market for the tying 
product was not enough to be considered substantial in the tying context. Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 26. (“Seventy per cent of the patients residing in Jefferson Parish 
enter hospitals other than East Jefferson. Thus East Jefferson’s ‘dominance’ over 
persons residing in Jefferson Parish is far from overwhelming.”). 
 154 Id. at 17. 
 155 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469 (defining cross-elasticity of demand as 
“the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in 
response to a price change in another”). 
 156 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. 
 157 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501. 
 158 Id. at 502. 
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de minimis.159 This requirement is meant to ensure that there 
is an actual possibility of anticompetitive effects of the tying 
arrangement.160 
Courts have consistently further limited the application 
of the per se rule. For example, courts have held that if the 
buyer would not have purchased the tied product from any 
seller if he hadn’t bought it as a result of the tying 
arrangement, the per se rule does not apply because no 
competitors are being harmed by the arrangement.161 
Additionally, some courts have held that if there is no actual or 
potential competitor in the market for a tied product, it cannot 
be shown that a substantial amount of commerce is foreclosed 
because the arrangement is not foreclosing the sales of any 
competitors.162 
Therefore, the elements required to invalidate an 
arrangement under the per se rule are163 (1) there are two 
separate and distinct products, and sale of the two products is 
tied;164 (2) the seller has sufficient market power in the market 
for the tying product such that they can force the buyer to 
purchase the tied product and restrain trade in the market for 
the tied product;165 and (3) a substantial amount of interstate 
commerce is foreclosed in the tied product market.166 
Additionally, some courts require that the seller must have an 
economic interest in the sale of the tied product or service, 
although the Supreme Court has not adopted this 
requirement.167 
If an arrangement does not meet the requirements for 
per se invalidity, it can still be found illegal under a rule of 
  
 159 E.g. Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1419 (11th 
Cir. 1987). 
 160 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. 
 161 See id.  
 162 See, e.g., Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
 163 There is no recent Supreme Court case neatly listing the elements of a 
tying claim, so these elements are pieced together from the most recent cases. Eastman 
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462, 464 (there must be two separate products, and there must be 
“appreciable economic power in the tying market”); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16 (a 
substantial volume of commerce must be foreclosed).  
 164 Package pricing, in which two items are sold together at a discount but are 
also available separately for a reasonable price, is not necessarily an illegal tying 
arrangement. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 24-25. 
 165 See supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text. 
 166 See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.  
 167 See, e.g., Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d. 312, 316 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
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reason analysis.168 For tying arrangements, the analysis focuses 
on the effects the arrangement has in the market for the tied 
product rather than the market for the tying product, as for  
the per se rule analysis.169 This is a less rigorous standard  
than the per se rule, and it is unlikely that a practice upheld 
under the per se rule will violate the easier-to-satisfy rule of 
reason test.170 
B.  A Tying Analysis of the NAR’s Membership 
Requirements 
The NAR’s practice of conditioning access to the MLS on 
membership in a Realtors-affiliated association satisfies even 
the modern per se rule’s more stringent requirements for 
invalidating a tying arrangement.171 First, the tying product 
(access to the MLS) is a product distinct and separate from the 
tied product (the Realtors association membership), and the 
two products are in fact tied together.172 In determining 
whether two products are separate and distinct, courts consider 
not the functional differences between the two products, but 
the nature of the demand for them.173 The two products must 
constitute separate product markets distinguishable to the 
consumer such that “[a]t least some consumers would purchase 
  
 168 Cantor, supra note 122, at 408. 
 169 Id.; see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29 (finding that the per se rule 
did not invalidate the challenged practice and applying the rule of reason standard by 
inquiring into “the actual effect of the exclusive contract on competition”). 
 170 Cantor, supra note 122, at 409.  
 171 Although three separate courts recently failed to find that the practice is 
an antitrust violation, all three cases had very similar facts. A slight variation in 
circumstances could lead to a different outcome, as Realtors have acknowledged. See, 
e.g., Brett M. Woodburn, The MLS Membership Rule—Antitrust or Not? Wisconsin and 
Kentucky Say No!, PA. ASS’N OF REALTORS, Feb. 2006, http://www.parealtor.org/ 
content/TheMLSMembershipRule.asp. The Supreme Court has noted that “formalistic 
distinctions . . . are generally disfavored in antitrust law” and that the Court “has 
preferred to decide antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘particular 
facts disclosed by the record.’” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 
U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (quoting Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n. v United States, 268 U.S. 
563, 579 (1925)).  
 172 “[P]roducts are not tied unless the supplier refuses to accommodate those 
who prefer one without the other.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 130, § 17.01i. 
Here, the NAR has refused to accommodate real estate agents who would prefer to 
access the MLS without joining the Realtors Association. 
 173 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984) (finding 
that there is a sufficient demand for anesthesiological services separate from hospital 
services such that they constitute two separate markets). 
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[one without the other].”174 Factors considered include whether 
the two products could be sold separately if the seller did not 
insist on selling them as a package, whether the two products 
are billed for separately, and whether other sellers in fact do 
sell the two products separately.175 
Several courts have previously determined that access 
to the MLS and a Realtors association membership are two 
separate and distinct products.176 For example, in Thompson v. 
Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit noted that 
the bill for Realtors association membership dues is separate 
from the bill to purchase MLS access, that brokers are 
permitted to join the Realtors association without being 
required to access the MLS, and that there are indeed other 
real estate professional associations in existence that do not 
offer MLS access.177  
Realtors associations have argued that there are not two 
separate markets for MLS access and real estate agent 
association memberships.178 They argue that MLS services are 
useless without an association membership, so the two must be 
considered one product.179 Indeed, some courts have expressed 
doubt regarding the existence of two products.180 In Wells Real 
Estate, for example, the court stated that real estate boards are 
not really “‘sellers’ in the usual sense of the term.”181 The court 
  
 174 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463 (“At least some consumers would 
purchase service without parts, because some service does not require parts, and some 
consumers, those who self-service for example, would purchase parts without service.”). 
 175 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 22-23 (finding that anesthesiological 
services are a separate and distinct product from hospital services because they could 
be provided separately, are billed separately, and are in fact sold separately by other 
hospitals). 
 176 See Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(finding, without discussion, that there was “no question” that the plaintiff 
demonstrated the existence of two separate products); Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, 
Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991); see also People v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 120 
Cal. App. 3d 459, 471, 479 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding that MLS access and Association 
memberships were separate and distinct products and remanding for a determination 
on the existence of an illegal tying arrangement, but also invalidating the practice of 
conditioning MLS access on agreement to an exclusive-right-to-sell listing). 
 177 Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1576 (both parties agreed that a broker was not 
permitted to use the multilisting service without joining the Realtors association). 
 178 See, e.g., id. at 1575.  
 179 Id. 
 180 See Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 
815 (1st Cir. 1988) (“We are unaware of any federal case that has characterized a 
multiple listing service as a tying arrangement.”). But c.f. Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1575-
76 (finding that MLS access and real estate association memberships were in fact two 
separate products).  
 181 Wells Real Estate, 850 F.2d at 815. 
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reasoned that MLS access was just an advantage gained by 
becoming an association member, not a separate product.182 
However, given the importance of the MLS to agents competing 
in the market for residential real estate,183 MLS access can 
hardly be dismissed as just one of the many benefits gained by 
becoming an association member. 
Additionally, since the NAR and its local affiliates still 
largely perpetuate the traditional model of real estate 
brokerage more brokers are likely to prefer to join associations 
that reflect their own professional ethics as newer models for 
real estate brokerage develop.184 Non-traditional brokers who 
need access to the MLS in order to compete effectively, but who 
disagree with the ethics and practices of the NAR, might very 
well wish to purchase access to the MLS without purchasing a 
Realtors association membership.185 Since “at least some” 
consumers are likely to purchase one of the products without 
purchasing the other, the two should be considered separate 
and distinct products for the purpose of tying law. 
Second, the NAR and its local affiliates possess 
substantial power in the market for MLS access, and it is 
probable that this power is strong enough to force buyers to 
purchase Association memberships. Market power exists when 
a seller can raise prices without incurring a loss in sales and 
enjoys some protection against entry by competitors into the 
market.186 Other factors used to determine whether the seller 
has substantial market power include (1) whether the tying 
product is so unique that competitors are unable to offer it187 or 
(2) whether the seller possesses a predominant share of the 
market for the tying product.188 The market power Realtors 
  
 182 Id. 
 183 See notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
 184 See supra Part II.D. 
 185 This assertion is evidenced directly by the fact that such real estate 
brokers have sued the NAR because they wish to obtain access to the MLS without 
joining an association they disagree with ethically. See, e.g., Buyer’s Corner Realty, Inc. 
v. N. Ky. Ass’n of Realtors, 410 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d, 198 F. App’x 485 
(6th Cir. 2007). In this case, the plaintiff was an exclusive buyers agent and member of 
the National Association of Exclusive Buyer Agents. She believed the NAR policy 
allowing dual agency is unethical, and she only joined the NAR to gain access to the 
MLS. The case was dismissed because the court determined that the plaintiff lacked 
standing, since no proper allegation of antitrust injury was made. Id. at 580. 
 186 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 130, § 5.01. 
 187 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984). 
 188 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464; see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-
27 (finding that the hospital did not have a sufficient share of the market such that 
forcing was probable). In this case, seventy percent of people living in the hospital’s 
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associations enjoy for sales of MLS access is clearly substantial 
enough to warrant application of the per se rule for tying.189  
The MLS is a product so unique that competitors are 
unable to offer it. The MLS is a tool widely recognized as a 
necessity to any real estate agent wishing to compete 
effectively.190 The system has developed over many years, and 
would be extremely difficult to recreate at this point. In 
Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., the plaintiff noted 
that a new system would need to build a strong collection of 
listings before becoming effective, and this would be extremely 
difficult in the fast-paced residential real estate market.191 
Additionally, the MLS has built an “insurmountable amount of 
good will.”192 The court noted that if these allegations were true, 
the MLS did have sufficient market power to justify application 
of the per se rule.193 Similarly, in Reifert, the court noted that 
the local MLS was unique and that it contained “near-perfect 
market information.”194 The court found that, because this 
information was not available anywhere else and it was 
impossible for a real estate agent to perform their job without 
the service,195 the MLS had “sufficient market power to restrain 
competition.”196 
Realtors associations possess a dominant share of the 
MLS market. One study found that Realtors affiliates have 
control over eighty-four percent of the MLSs in the United 
States.197 Additionally, the market for MLS access has very low 
  
district in fact chose to enter other hospitals. Additionally the court determined that 
because every patient who received the anisthesiological services actually needed them, 
there was no evidence that anyone was being forced to accept the service. Id. at 28. 
Therefore, the court determined that the per se rule did not apply. Id. at 28-29. 
 189 Note that the “relevant market” changes under this analysis depending on 
which particular MLS is challenged. For the purposes of this discussion on the practice 
generally, the relevant market consists broadly of all MLSs in the nation. 
 190 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
 191 Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). 
This was one argument made by the plaintiffs in Thompson regarding the market 
power of the MLS system. Plaintiffs also presented evidence that an individual actually 
did try to compete by starting his own listing service, but failed. Id. The Eleventh 
Circuit found that the plaintiffs raised a question of material fact as to whether the 
multilisting service had sufficient market power and remanded the case to the district 
court. The case settled before further proceedings, and an open MLS was the 
negotiated result. Id. 
 192 Id.  
 193 Id.  
 194 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d. 312, 317 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 195 Id.  
 196 Id. 
 197 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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cross-elasticity of demand. If the NAR were to raise the price of 
access, it is unlikely sales would decrease because brokers must 
have access to the MLS in order to effectively do their job.198 
Since the MLS is a highly unique product that is difficult to 
replicate, the Realtors possess a dominant share of the market 
for MLS services, and there is low cross-price elasticity for 
demand in the MLS market, the Realtors associations have 
sufficiently substantial market power to satisfy the per se rule 
against tying arrangements. 
Third, the amount of commerce tied in the market for 
association memberships is certainly more than “de minimis” 
and is therefore substantial. Assuming a nationwide challenge, 
the relevant figure is the total amount of sales for NAR and 
state and local affiliated memberships.199 The court in 
Thompson determined that annual membership dues of 
$30,000 to $70,000 lost to the challenged association were 
“clearly substantial.”200 The NAR’s annual membership fees 
alone are close to $100 million.201 Additional fees are also paid 
to local and sometimes state Realtors associations in order to 
access the MLS. There is no question that the total amount is 
substantial. 
Therefore, millions of dollars are tied up in membership 
fees for the NAR, and many of these brokers might be joining 
the NAR only to obtain access to the MLS. When agents are 
forced to join state, local, and nationwide Realtors 
  
 198 Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1577; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470 (1992). Kodak argued that it did not have 
sufficient market power because raising prices for the tied products (parts and services) 
would result in a disastrous drop in sales for the tying product (photocopier and 
micrographic equipment). Id. However, the Court found that the evidence did not 
support this theory, noting that “[s]ervice prices have risen for Kodak customers, but 
there is no evidence or assertion that Kodak equipment sales have dropped.” Id. at 472. 
The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s reversal of summary judgment in 
favor of Kodak on the tying claim. Id. at 486. 
 199 In Thompson, the court, although still finding that a not insubstantial 
amount of commerce was affected, took a different approach. One of the challenging 
plaintiffs was another real estate agent association that claimed it lost close to 400 
members due to the tying arrangement. The court multiplied this number of members 
by the approximate annual dues those 400 members paid to Realtors Associations, in 
determining that $30,000 to $70,000 was a not insubstantial amount of commerce. 
Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1578. However, according to the rule from Fortner I, evidence of 
the actual dollar amount of sales is not necessary; an estimate of the amount of dollars 
tied up by the tying arrangement will suffice. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501. 
 200 Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1578.  
 201 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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associations,202 they might spend $300 to $500 a year on 
membership dues.203 It seems likely that these brokers will be 
less willing or able to spend even more money to join an 
alternative real estate professional organization of their 
choice.204 This reality will make it very difficult for the new, 
nontraditional associations to compete for members and 
effectively constricts expansion of these new models.  
Several courts, however, have gone beyond this analysis 
and looked at the market for the tied product to find that there 
is in fact no market for association memberships, and therefore 
no trade in the tied product market can be restrained.205 For 
example, in Wells Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Board of 
Realtors, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, stating that 
it had failed to show any anticompetitive effects in the tied 
market because there were no competitors for association 
memberships.206 The court, however, was careful to note that 
under the per se rule, plaintiffs do not have to show the actual 
scope of the anticompetitive effects.207 They must simply “make 
some minimal showing of real or potential foreclosed commerce 
caused by the tie . . . .”208 
In Reifert v. South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp., the 
court cited Wells in holding that there were no competitors for 
association memberships.209 The plaintiff in Reifert offered a list 
of twelve other associations competing for members in the 
region, including the NAEBA, but the court dismissed these 
competitors as “unlikely substitutes” for the Realtors 
association.210 These other associations were found to serve 
different purposes because they either catered to specific ethnic 
or racial groups, exclusive buyers agents, or only independent 
  
 202 Some critics have argued that this practice—requiring membership in all 
three levels of Realtor Associations, is an illegal tying arrangement in itself. See, e.g., 
BARRY, supra note 18, at 53.  
 203 See supra note 20. 
 204 See supra note 21. 
 205 These courts have arguably applied more of a rule of reason analysis. 
However, since the Supreme Court has been consistently eroding the per se rule, this 
Note assumes that the method used by these courts will be upheld and employs the 
same analysis.  
 206 Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 815 
(1st Cir. 1988). 
 207 Id. at 815 n.11. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 319 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 210 Id. 
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brokers.211 The court also noted that since these other 
associations did not have cross-price elasticity of demand with 
national and local Realtors associations, they could not be 
competitors.212  
In determining whether there are competitors for 
association memberships, courts should not define the relevant 
market as narrowly as the Reifert court. The Reifert court’s 
assertion that there is no cross-price elasticity of demand 
between Realtors association memberships and those in other 
real estate professional organizations may be true. However, 
this lack of cross-price elasticity could very well be an effect of 
the tying arrangement. As a result of the strength of the tying 
arrangement, no real estate agent would purchase another 
association membership even if the NAR raised its membership 
prices because they must have access to the MLS.  
The Reifert court’s reliance on the Wells decision is 
misplaced. In Wells, the plaintiff did not present evidence of 
any other competitors.213 The court stated that it is not that “a 
plaintiff necessarily must prove the actual scope of 
anticompetitive effects in the market—the per se rule 
eliminates such a requirement.”214 But the plaintiff must make 
[a] minimal showing of real or potential foreclosed commerce 
caused by the tie.”215 In Reifert, the plaintiff clearly made this 
minimal showing by listing twelve potential competitors. The 
Reifert court’s requirement of showing the actual economic 
effects in the tied product market beyond this minimal showing 
is appropriate under a rule of reason analysis, but should not 
  
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 319-20. The court distinguished Thompson because in that case the 
plaintiff was another association alleging a loss of members to the Realtors association 
as a result of the tie. Interestingly, the association in Thompson that was considered a 
competitor of the Realtors catered to African American real estate agents. See 
Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991). The Reifert 
court however, claimed that associations catering to a specific racial group cannot be 
competitors with Realtors associations. Reifert, 450 F.3d at 319. 
 213 Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 815 
(1st Cir. 1988). 
 214 Id. at 815 n.11. 
 215 Id.; see also Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1293 (2d Cir. 
1974). Coniglio was similarly dismissed because the court found that the Plaintiff 
failed to show that there were any competitors in the market for the tied product. Id. at 
1291. The plaintiff tried to define the relevant market extremely broadly in order to 
find competitors for a market selling tickets to a professional football league’s games. 
Id. at 1292. The plaintiff argued that any other activity or event a person could attend 
on that night was a competitor of the football league, foreclosed by the tie. Id. This 
definition of the relevant market is clearly unreasonably broad, as the court held. Id. 
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be applied in this situation, where the probability of forcing is 
probable. 
While it may have been true in the early years of the 
NAR that there were no competing associations, in the 
radically changing residential real estate industry of today, it 
is undeniable that there are now competing real estate agent 
membership associations.216 Furthermore, commentators have 
noted that these new, smaller associations struggle to grow in 
the presence of the NAR because only the NAR allows brokers 
access to the MLS.217 In fact, “the smaller association may 
suffer significant membership losses to the point of 
dissolution.”218 
Therefore, the NAR practice requiring membership in a 
Realtor-affiliated association in order to obtain MLS access 
should be invalidated under the per se rule for tying 
arrangements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
V. EXCLUDING NON-NAR MEMBERS FROM ACCESSING  
THE MLS IS AN ILLEGAL GROUP BOYCOTT UNDER  
THE SHERMAN ACT 
A. The Applicable Standard for Group Boycott Claims 
For group boycott claims, the per se rule applies only 
when the challenged exclusion is “plainly anticompetitive” and 
“lacking . . . any redeeming virtue.”219 A practice meets this test 
when it “can further none of the Act’s goals—when it operates 
to deny to consumers the opportunity to choose among 
alternative offers without offering the possibility of any joint, 
efficiency-producing economic activities.”220 Under the rule of 
reason analysis for a group boycott, the challenged competitor 
must first be shown to possess sufficient market power such 
that a Sherman Act analysis of the exclusion policy is 
warranted.221 The burden then shifts to the defendant to show 
that it had a legitimate business purpose for its refusal to 
  
 216 See supra Part II.D. 
 217 Robert D. Butters, Real Estate Brokers and Antitrust Laws, REAL ESTATE 
BROKERS AND ANTITRUST LAWS (2006), at § 8.04 2.b.iv. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) 
(quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); N. Pac. 
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
 220 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1364 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 221 Id. 
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deal.222 The rule therefore involves a determination of the “net 
effect” of the arrangement; if the net effect of the exclusion is 
pro-competitive, the exclusion will be allowed.223 
B. Application of the Group Boycott Theory 
Challenges to NAR-affiliated associations under the 
group boycott theory have historically been somewhat more 
successful than those based on a tying theory.224 Courts are 
hesitant to apply the per se standard to a group boycott 
analysis of restrictions on MLS access.225 Application of the per 
se rule in the group boycott context has different implications 
than using the per se rule in the tying context.226 If a per se rule 
invalidated the membership requirement as a group boycott, 
the holding could be read to mean that any membership 
association providing a benefit to its members is required to 
provide that benefit to nonmembers.227 However, one can argue 
that because the per se rule only invalidates plainly 
anticompetitive practices, and most association membership 
benefits are not plainly anticompetitive, this worry is 
unfounded. 
Nevertheless, because courts generally use a rule of 
reason analysis when examining criteria excluding brokers 
from access to the MLS, this Note does the same. Under this 
standard, the NAR practice should be invalidated as a group 
boycott under the Sherman Act. First, the NAR-controlled 
MLSs have enough market power to justify scrutinizing any 
limitations put on broker access to them.228 Second, the possible 
anticompetitive harm caused by excluding a broker from MLS 
access is high, and there is no pro-competitive justification for 
requiring NAR membership that outweighs this potential 
harm.229 
  
 222 Id. at 1374-75. 
 223 Id. at 1370. 
 224 See, e.g., Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1351; Marin County Bd. of Realtors 
v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1976) (invalidating the Realtors board rule denying 
access to the MLS by nonmembers under the rule of reason standard). 
 225 See Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1367. 
 226 In Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., for example, the court 
followed a per se analysis for the tying claim, but followed Realty Multi-List and 
applied a rule of reason analysis for the group boycott claim. 934 F.2d 1566, 1579-80 
(11th Cir. 1991). 
 227 See, e.g., Palsson, 549 P.2d at 839. 
 228 See infra Part V.B.1. 
 229 See infra Part V.B.2. 
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1. The MLS Has Sufficient Market Power to Justify 
Scrutinizing Membership Requirements Limiting 
Access to It 
Market power exists if the MLS “is of ‘sufficient 
economic importance that exclusion results in the denial of the 
opportunity to compete effectively on equal terms.’”230 The 
factors courts consider include the number and dollar amount 
of sales made through the MLS, the number of brokers in the 
market who use the MLS, and whether member brokers 
themselves acknowledge that MLS access is a competitive 
advantage.231 The relevant market is the residential housing 
market in the geographic area where the MLS operates.232 
Courts generally agree that the MLS has sufficient market 
power to justify scrutiny of access restrictions.233  
NAR-operated MLSs list the majority of residential 
properties bought and sold across the United States.234 The 
relevant figure for determining market power will change 
depending on the geographic area covered by the particular 
MLS being challenged. One court found sufficient market 
power where the MLS accounted for “35% of the total dollar 
sales of all real property . . . and a presumably much higher 
percentage of the sales dollars for residential property [in the 
relevant geographic market].”235 Another court found that 
because the MLS listings accounted for over $50 million in 
sales, it was clear that nonmembers were “foreclosed from a not 
insignificant segment of the market.”236 Recent complaints 
alleged that the amount of sales made through the challenged 
  
 230 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1373 (quoting Austin, supra note 11, at 
1346) (emphasis in original). 
 231 Id. at 1374; Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1580. 
 232 See, e.g., Palsson, 549 P.2d at 842. 
 233 In Palsson, looking at statistics citing the dollar amount of sales 
attributable to the MLS, and considering the number of brokers using the system, the 
court concluded that the “problems of a nonmember of the board in competing against 
this colossus are manifest.” Id. at 842. In Thompson, the court stated that the 
dominating role of the MLS alleged by the plaintiffs was sufficient such that summary 
judgment was inappropriate on the market power prong of a group boycott analysis. 
Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1580-81. 
 234 See infra notes 236-239 and accompanying text. 
 235 Palsson, 549 P.2d at 842.  
 236 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1374. 
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MLSs in the relevant geographic area accounted for 
“[a]pproximately $2.2 billion”237 and “[n]early $1 billion.”238  
These amounts are clearly large enough to constitute 
sufficient market power. In finding sufficient market power, 
one court found it relevant that “a vast majority of the active 
residential real estate brokers” in the relevant geographic area 
use the MLS.239 Another court similarly noted that “[t]hree-
fourths of the brokers actively selling residential real property” 
use the system.240 Recent complaints have alleged that the 
number of active residential real estate agents in the relevant 
geographic area that use the MLS to buy and sell real estate is 
“[a]pproximately 100%”241 or “[o]ver 90%.”242 As discussed above, 
access to the MLS is generally recognized as a practical 
necessity for a broker.243  
These recent decisions, however, stated that because 
there is no competitive market for real estate agent association 
memberships, there is insufficient market power to warrant 
review of the membership requirements.244 These courts did not 
analyze the proper market in making this determination. The 
relevant market should not be the market for association 
memberships, as in a rule of reason tying analysis.245 The 
relevant market should be the market for residential real 
estate in the proper geographic area, as described above.246  
Moreover, even using the market definition offered in 
these opinions, there is sufficient market power to warrant 
judicial review. Contrary to the courts’ findings, there is a 
competitive market for association memberships.247 Alternative 
  
 237 First Amended Complaint at 1, Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., No.  
04-C-0969-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23431 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005) [hereinafter 
Reifert Complaint]. 
 238 First Amended Complaint at 1, Prencipe v. Spokane Bd. of Realtors, No. 
CV-04-0319-LRS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29828 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 2006) [hereinafter 
Prencipe Complaint]. 
 239 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d. at 1374. 
 240 Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 842 (Cal. 1976). 
 241 Reifert Complaint, supra note 237, at 1. 
 242 Prencipe Complaint, supra note 238, at 1. 
 243 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
 244 See Reifert, 450 F.3d at 321. 
 245 One of these courts even stated, “To prove a group boycott, a plaintiff must 
establish that the membership requirement has had an adverse impact upon 
competition in the market for the tied product.” Id. This statement does not cite to any 
authority. This court seemed to confuse a rule of reason analysis for a tying claim with 
the analysis for a group boycott claim. See id.  
 246 See supra notes 234-240 and accompanying text. 
 247 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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associations that cater to non-traditional methods of real estate 
brokerage are becoming more common.248  
2. There Is No Legitimate Competitive Reason to 
Justify Prohibiting Non-Realtors from Accessing  
the MLS 
The rule of reason analysis for group boycotts requires 
the balancing of any pro-competitive justifications for the 
exclusion of nonmembers with the potential anticompetitive 
effects of the practice.249 The burden of proof would be on  
the Realtors association to show that the pro-competitive 
effects of the membership requirement outweigh the potential 
anticompetitive consequences.250 Courts have recognized that 
“exclusion from the multiple listing service has pronounced 
anticompetitive effects; unless those effects are counter-
balanced by some direct benefit to competition, the regulation 
must fail.”251  
Limiting MLS access to Realtors has harmful 
anticompetitive effects on two levels. First, the requirement 
affects competition between brokers because excluding a broker 
from accessing the MLS would be competitively detrimental to 
that broker. Second, the membership requirement might 
ultimately affect consumers. The NAR encourages the 
perseverance of the traditional model for real estate 
brokerage.252 Discouraging the growth of alternative models for 
brokerage limits consumer choice and helps to maintain steady 
commission rates.253  
There are no pro-competitive justifications sufficient to 
outweigh these extensive anticompetitive effects. Courts have 
differed on this prong of the analysis. Only in California have 
courts decided that there is no legitimate competitive purpose 
for requiring a Realtors association membership to access the 
MLS. This jurisdiction holds that even “where membership in 
the board is open to all real estate licensees on reasonable and 
  
 248 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 249 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1375-76 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 250 Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1581 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 251 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d. at 1376. 
 252 See supra Part IV. 
 253 See supra Part IV; see also Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 549 
P.2d 833, 843 (Cal. 1976) (describing how a “buyer or seller of a home also suffers by 
the board’s practices”). 
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nondiscriminatory terms,” nonmembers must be granted access 
to the MLS.254 Other courts, while not invalidating the 
membership requirement altogether, have invalidated specific 
membership criteria as unreasonable for lacking a justifiable 
pro-competitive purpose.255 The cases from 2006, including 
Reifert, did not even reach this step of the analysis. Instead, 
these courts rested their decisions on the arguably incorrect 
conclusion that there can be no group boycott in this situation 
because there is “no competitive market” for Realtors 
association memberships.256  
Realtors associations commonly offer the justification 
that they need to maintain a level of professional conduct in 
MLS operation. The associations argue that this purpose is 
fulfilled by requiring all NAR members to adhere to its ethical 
code of conduct. Several arguments refute this theory. First, 
the MLS as a stand-alone entity could just create its own 
standards of professionalism that brokers would need to agree 
to before using the MLS. These rules could achieve the same 
effect as the NAR Code.257 Second, state licensing commissions 
set professional standards that must be met in order to even 
obtain a license to practice real estate.258 Accordingly, 
  
 254 People v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 155 Cal. App. 3d 578, 588 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(clarifying the scope of the holding in Palsson). Other courts, however, disagree with 
this analysis. Some courts refuse to find a group boycott, arguing that the membership 
requirements are not arbitrary or difficult to meet. These courts reason that since any 
broker wishing to join the service may do so, they are not actually being excluded. See, 
e.g., Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 446 A.2d 83, 92 (N.J. 1982) 
(“Where there are no exclusionary conditions attached to Realtor board membership, 
and there is no contention that the cost is prohibitively high, it is difficult to see any 
affront to competition.”).  
 255 In Realty Multi-List, the court decided that in order for the MLS to 
function effectively, some membership criteria were necessary to ensure that those 
participating would adhere to a level of professional standards. 629 F.2d at 1381. 
However, the court ultimately decided that requiring a “favorable credit report and 
business reputation” was not narrowly tailored enough to any pro-competitive concern. 
Id. (citation omitted). Further, the standard was too subjective. Id. Additionally it was 
unreasonable to require the applicant to have an office “open during customary hours 
of business,” since the requirement was not necessary for a functioning MLS. Id. at 
1383 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court also invalidated the 
requirement that the applicant purchase one share of stock in the corporation at a fee 
set by the board—currently $1000. Id. at 1389. The court stated that although such an 
association can charge a fee, it must be based on its legitimate operational needs. Id.  
 256 See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.  
 257 Thompson v. Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 
1991) (“Such rules would not constitute a group boycott and would achieve the same 
ends that Metro claims the Realtor membership requirements achieve.”).  
 258 In Realty Multi-List, the court required the MLS to “make a showing either 
that the legitimate needs of the service require protection in excess of that provided by 
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membership in a Realtors association is not necessary to 
ensure professionalism in MLS operation.  
A second justification Realtors offer is that the 
arbitration to settle commission disputes mandated by the 
Realtors ethical code is pro-competition. The association claims 
that without an arbitration clause, Realtors would be less 
likely to use the MLS, as they would not feel secure that there 
is a method for resolving commission disputes. However, the 
arbitration process the NAR uses has actually been criticized 
as anticompetitive and discriminatory toward non-traditional 
brokers.259 In addition, the same argument as above applies 
here—the MLS itself could mandate arbitration to settle 
disputes. There is no reason why separate membership in the 
NAR is necessary to achieve this result. 
Brokers should not have to pay a fee to Realtors 
associations in excess of the amount used to maintain the MLS. 
Courts have stated that fees should be limited to what is 
needed for “maintenance and development” of the MLS.260 In 
order to access the MLS, brokers generally must pay dues not 
just to the NAR, but also to the local and state chapter of the 
NAR. The fee paid to join the NAR and local associations 
clearly goes to more than just maintaining the MLS. In fact, a 
look at NAR’s 2005 annual report reveals that the lion’s share 
of membership dues were used for “PR and Communications” 
(27%), followed by “Public Policy” (15%).261 Interestingly much 
of this “PR” might actually be spent to try and improve the 
public’s negative image of Realtors as unethical and 
dishonest.262 Only 6% of the dues are allocated to “Technology,” 
and the report does not specify whether this even refers to the 
MLS. 
Because the anticompetitive potential in requiring 
membership in the NAR to access the MLS outweighs any 
  
the state or that the state does not adequately enforce its own regulations.” 629 F.2d at 
1380. 
 259 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 260 Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1386-87 (“In order to avoid running afoul of 
the antitrust laws, [the association] may not assume the power to set fees at a level 
greater than its legitimate needs.”). 
 261 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2006), 
available at http://www.realtor.org/realtororg.nsf/pages/2005_annual_report. “Public 
policy” likely refers to NAR efforts to perpetuate the traditional model for residential 
real estate brokerage. 
 262 See Blanche Evans, Why Real Estate Agents Fell Off Gallup’s Honesty-
Integrity List, REALTY TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, http://realtytimes.com/rtapages/ 
20020106_gallup.htm. 
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potential pro-competitive justifications for the requirement, the 
practice should be invalidated as a group boycott.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The once-uniform residential real estate industry is 
changing and real estate professionals should embrace and 
encourage new business models that serve consumer interests. 
The practice of requiring membership in a Realtor association 
in order to access the competitively necessary MLS should end. 
The arrangement constitutes both an illegal tying arrangement 
and a group boycott under the Sherman Act. Absent a judicial 
finding of an antitrust violation, there must be action by state 
real estate commissions263 or legislatures to end the practice. 
However, since real estate commissions are frequently 
dominated by traditionalist Realtors with a strong interest in 
maintaining the status quo in the residential real estate 
industry,264 it may be necessary for state or federal legislatures 
to become involved.265 This change will encourage the 
development of a truly competitive industry for residential real 
estate in the future. 
Beth Nagalski† 
  
 263 Largely in order to ensure consumer protection, all fifty states have 
created state agencies responsible for licensing real estate agents, and there is a 
similar national counterpart. White, supra note 1, at 19. Recent actions of many of 
these agencies, however, have actually been arguably anticompetitive, and anti-
consumerist. For example, minimum service laws, which require all brokers to provide 
at least a certain level of service in order to obtain their license are aimed at thwarting 
the growth of the discount broker industry. See, e.g., Hahn et al., supra note 1, at 88 
(“Legislatures . . . have recently introduced or enacted bills to prohibit real estate 
agents from offering more limited service, which they can perform at a lower fee.”). 
Both the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have publicly 
expressed their opposition to such laws. Id.   
 264  See Brobeck Testimony, supra note 5; see Part II.C. 
 265  Note, however, that the NAR is an extremely powerful lobbying force in 
Washington, so passing legislation that will directly affect the NAR’s financial status is 
not likely to be easy. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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